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In recent years United States antitrust law has gone international with a
vengeance. Thus, "international antitrust" is no longer the sole preserve of
academicians and a small band of devotees. Instead, it has become an impor-
tant factor in the international business arena: a factor that businessmen
must address and one which United States Attorney Generals feel they must
deal with in policy statements.' There have been some changes in United
States law which make it more relevant to international transactions, such as
passage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act2 and extension of the Anti-
trust Civil Process Act' so as to authorize government inquiry outside the
territorial limits of the United States. But the antitrust laws themselves have
stayed much in the form in which they were originally enacted, in 1890, 1914,
1936 and so forth. What has changed drastically is the economic environment
in which those laws operate. As was inevitable, national economies have
grown increasingly interdependent, to an extent inextricably so. The antitrust
laws and their enforcers have made efforts to adapt in order to stay relevant
in this changing economic milieu.
As the Antitrust Division's Antitrust Guide for International Operations,'
itself a harbinger of the times, points out: "Competition by foreign pro-
*Mr. Joelson practices law in Washington, D.C.
'See, e.g., Address by Attorney General Griffin B. Bell, American Bar Association Annual
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International Bar Association Meeting (Nov. 3, 1977); Remarks by John H. Shenefield, Extra-
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ducers is particularly important to the American consuming public when
imports are or could be a major source of a particular product, or where the
domestic industry is dominated by a single firm or a few firms."' So the
Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission keep a close watch for
competitive restraints affecting the flow of imports into the United States.
The private antitrust enforcers are not outdone in this respect, however. For
example, a massive private antitrust suit brought by an American corpora-
tion against members of an alleged uranium cartel recently entered its fourth
year, 6 and more recently, the Machinists Union sued the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and its members.7 Both suits, not
surprisingly, relate to that current bate noire of the American consuming
public, the energy industries.
On the other hand, American businessmen have reiterated the charge that
the United States antitrust laws hamper this nation's efforts to boost exports
and improve our balance of payments position.' The Antitrust Division re-
jects these claims and stresses the antitrust concern that "each United States-
based firm engaged in the export of goods, services, or capital should be
allowed to compete on the merits and not be shut out by some restriction
imposed by a bigger or less principled competitor." 9 The issue of whether
American firms are unfairly hampered in their efforts abroad by the reach of
United States antitrust becomes even more complex when it is posed in the
context of the "Arab boycott," as is the case in the Bechtel litigation. 0 And,
as we shall discuss later, the issue of whether the Webb-Pomerene Act,'' the
antitrust exemption designed to promote exports, should be expanded, re-
pealed, or otherwise adjusted has just been neatly ducked by the National
Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures, which re-
ferred the matter to the Congress.' I
The questions of exports and imports do not, however, exhaust the subject
matter. The Antitrust Division, for example, generated more headlines and
more threats of retaliation from abroad some time ago when it obtained the
indictments under the Sherman Act of a number of international shipping
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lines for allegedly conspiring on the terms relating to the shipment of freight
in the United States-Europe trade. The nature of the alleged conspiracy was
outside the scope of the antitrust exemption afforded by the Shipping Act. I3
These disputes, as different as they are on their faces, pose some trouble-
some common questions:
1. Are the United States antitrust laws, designed decades ago largely to
deal with the domestic "trusts," adequate to cope with the complexities of
our international economy?
2. Are these laws, which were designed to deal with private business re-
straints, suited to test the marketing arrangements fostered by foreign gov-
ernments in the management of their economies?
3. If the answer is that the antitrust laws are adaptable to today's interna-
tional issues, are the courts sufficiently adaptable for the purpose? That is, if
decisions such as Timberlane" are to be heeded, United States courts are now
to take into account foreign governmental interests affected by antitrust liti-
gation. Will the courts adjust to this new role?
Before we can attempt answers to these questions, we need to take a closer
look at the United States antitrust laws and at the legal issues that underlie the
broader questions.
I. The Scope of the United States Antitrust Laws
The starting place, in determining the application of the United States
antitrust laws to international transactions, is, of course, the language of
each statute. In some instances Congress obviously gave the question of in-
ternational commeFce careful thought and draftmanship; in other statutes,
however, the international scope of the provisions seems to have been, at
best, a low priority consideration. The generality of the language utilized, a
common problem with legislative antitrust formulations, has given the courts
much leeway in developing United States international antitrust policy.
The Sherman Act, our basic antitrust law, contains a prohibition against
contracts or combinations in restraint of trade or commerce ". . . with for-
eign nations"" and also contains a prohibition against acts of monopoliza-
tion with respect to any part of the trade or commerce "with foreign na-
tions. " 6 A more obscure statute, the Wilson Tariff Act, declares unlawful
combinations in restraint of trade relating to the importation of articles from
a foreign country." This statute has had little independent use and, largely
'United States v. Atlantic Container Ltd., No 79-00271 (D.C. Cir., filed June 1, 1979). The
defendants pleaded no contest to the felony charges and were fined a total of $6.1 million.
According to the Justice Department, this is the most severe penalty ever imposed under the
Sherman Act.
"Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
"Sherman Antitrust Act §1, 15 U.S.C. §1 (1976).
61d. §2.
"15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1976).
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because of its forfeiture provisions, has been utilized primarily to accompany
Sherman Act allegations.
The Clayton Act has a variety of antitrust provisions and, with it, a per-
plexing array of phrases relating to the United States "commerce" criterion.
Section 3 of the Clayton Act, ' which relates to "tying" and exclusive dealing
arrangements, applies only to persons engaged in United States commerce,
where the challenged transaction takes place in the course of such commerce,
and the commodities concerned are "for use, consumption or resale within
the United States or its territories."'' 9 This language seems, among other
things, to exclude coverage of sales by American firms abroad (exports). It
should be noted, however, that foreign sales involving the kind of activity
sought to be precluded by section 3 of the Clayton Act might be reached by
the broader language of section 1 of the Sherman Act or section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act. 0
Another section of the Clayton Act, section 7, is our basic antimerger
law," but it also carries some problems in the international context. It bars
the acquisition by a corporation engaged in United States commerce of stock
or assets of another corporation engaged in United States commerce, where
the effect may be anticompetitive "in any line of commerce in any section of
the country."22 Does this language mean that a merger or joint venture which
reduces competition only in foreign markets is not covered? This is an un-
answered question, but once again the Sherman and FTC Acts may be avail-
able to help fill the possible loophole.
The Robinson-Patman Act, an amendment to section 2 of the Clayton
Act,2" bars certain discriminatory practices by sellers which favor large buy-
ers. It also is perplexing in its philosophy towards international transactions
inasmuch as its subdivisions use varying phrases on the subject. Subsection
2(a) prohibits price discrimination as to commodities sold "for use, con-
sumption, or resale within the United States" or its territories, thereby ex-
cluding export transactions. In contrast, the limitation is not found in subsec-
tions (c), (d), and (e), which deal with prohibited brokerage payments,
promotional allowances, services and facilities. The courts have given these
differences in language effect in determining the territorial sweep of the vari-
ous provisions.
4
Finally, we have the earlier mentioned section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act" which, with its recent broadening amendment, applies to unfair
methods of competition "in or affecting" United States commerce. This
'615 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
1I d.
"15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1) (1976).
'15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
221d.
2I15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976).
"See, e.g., Baysoy v. Jessop Steel Co., 90 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Pa. 1950).
"15 U.S.C. § 45 (a) (1) (1976).
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broad jurisdictional sweep, when coupled with the fact that the FTC Act can
reach all practices which violate antitrust principles or other practices,"6 gives
section 5 great importance in United States international antitrust law, even
though the Commission has thus far used it sparingly in this regard.
Because of the broad scope of these laws, all international commercial
arrangements are susceptible to United States antitrust law if the requisite
impact on the commerce of the United States is established. This means not
only that cartels must be wary, but that simple sales agreements, distribution
arrangements, mergers, joint ventures, and licensing of patents, know-how
or trademarks must be able to face antitrust scrutiny. The usual focus of the
scrutiny, as we have indicated, is whether there is a restraint on the availabil-
ity, the volume, or the price of imports or of exports. But even where exports,
imports, or transportation to or from the United States are not involved, a
restraint on United States commerce may cause the antitrust laws to be trig-
gered. For example, in the Pacific Seafarers case,2 7 the plaintiff and defen-
dant shipping lines were both United States nationals. Furthermore, a United
States government agency was financing the plaintiff's cargoes. These facts
were held to establish a sufficient "nexus" to bring into effect United States
antitrust law, notwithstanding the fact that the goods were owned by for-
eigners and being shipped between foreign ports.
I1. Antitrust Exemptions and Defenses Relating to
Foreign Commerce
Because the foreign commerce of the United States necessarily touches on
the interests of foreign governments or persons who owe no allegiance to the
United States antitrust laws, it is natural that our law will have carved out
certain exemptions and defenses to allow for the special needs of the interna-
tional setting. However, these exemptions and defenses are, generally, quite
narrow, controversial, and uncertain of application. This situation reflects
the basic dilemma concerning the application of the United States antitrust
laws to international transactions: on the one hand, if antitrust is to remain a
cornerstone of our economic philosophy, it cannot be limited to domestic
transactions; on the other hand, once United States antitrust is given play in
the international arena, where the economic and legal philosophies of other
governments are entitled to equal status, there is no neat formula for its
application.
One major antitrust exemption affecting international trade is the Webb-
Pomerene Act, 8 which was enacted in 1918 in an effort to give American
exporters some help in their struggles against foreign competitors. Then, as
now, the claim was that foreign industries were both cartelized and assisted
2FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233(1972).
'Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far E. Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969).
"15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976).
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by their governments, while United States businessmen were deterred by their
government from cooperating with each other by the strict demands of the
antitrust laws. The Webb-Pomerene Act exempts from the Sherman Act the
activities of associations of export traders which are performed in the course
of export trade. But such activities are not exempt to the extent that they are
"in restraint of trade within the United States," nor may such activities re-
strain the export trade of domestic competitors of the associations. Whether
because of these limitations or the hostile scrutiny of the antitrust enforce-
ment agencies, or both,29 the Webb-Pomerene exemption has had little im-
pact on the nation's export trade.
Several other exemptions or defenses are of particular interest to interna-
tional lawyers because they bear on the clash between the United States anti-
trust philosophy and the often differing philosophies of other sovereign gov-
ernments. Indeed, other governments have done more than philosophized.
They have, in a number of cases, quite openly organized and conducted a
variety of cartels. Armed with a different economic viewpoint, many govern-
ments consider coordinated restrictions of production, sales quotas, or price-
fixing to constitute not predatory commercial behavior, but the logical hus-
banding and maximization of precious natural resources.
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,30 which cir-
cumscribes the immunity of foreign governments to antitrust and other legal
action in United States courts, the sovereign immunity defense does not ex-
tend to the "commercial" activity of a foreign state or of an entity owned by
it. Whether particular activity is "commercial" or "governmental" is to be
determined, under the statute, by reference to the nature of the course of
conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its pur-
pose.3 ' This new legislation goes a part of the way towards solving the dispute
over the breadth of the sovereign immunity defense that existed for years."
But it still leaves as a fertile field for litigation the key question of when, in an
age of government-controlled economies, particular government action is
''commercial" or "governmental.''
A related defense is that of "sovereign compulsion." Under this defense,
private parties charged with United States antitrust violations plead that their
conduct was compelled by a foreign government. Interamerican Refining
Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo Inc." presents the reasoning behind such a de-
fense by noting that "[w]hen a nation compels a trade practice, firms there
have no choice but to obey. Acts of business become effectively acts of the
"Two Webb-Pomerene export associations and their members were held to have engaged in
nonexempt conduct and hence to have violated the Sherman Act in United States Alkali Export
Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196 (1945).
3028 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976 & Supp. 1979)
311d. § 1603(d).
"See Joelson & Griffin, The Legal Status of Nation-State Cartels Under United States Anti-
trust and Public International Law, 9 INT'L LAW. 617 (1975).
"1307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
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sovereign.""' This defense does not apply when the challenged conduct is
merely approved or endorsed, rather than compelled, by the foreign govern-
ment.II Moreover, the Department of Justice, which does not agree with the
analysis made in the Interamerican Refining Corp. decision, stresses that,
"[a]lthough the United States courts will recognize an antitrust defense for
actions taken or compelled by a foreign sovereign within its territory, such
recognition will not be afforded with respect to an act inside the United
States."'
Finally, there is the "act of state" defense. The classic statement of this
doctrine was in Underhill v. Hernandez, " in which the Supreme Court ruled
that "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another, done within its own territory."" It was reiterated by
the Supreme Court in the Alfred Dunhill decision in 1976." Here also the
Antitrust Division has anxiously sought to circumscribe the defense, stressing
that the act must be taken by a foreign sovereign within its own territory and
must be a "valid" act under the sovereign's own law,' although this latter
qualification appears to run counter to the "act of state" doctrine's underly-
ing rationale. Recent decisions have indicated that the courts too are pre-
pared to construe the act of state doctrine narrowly in affording shelter to
antitrust challenge. In Timberlane Lumber Co. v Bank of America" the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the jurisdiction of a
foreign court over a private litigation concerning a security interest did not
give rise to an act of state. Similarly in Mannington Mills, Inc. v Congoleum
Corp"2 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that the plaintiff was
entitled to complain that the defendant had secured foreign patents by fraud,
since the mere issuance of patents by a foreign power did not constitute an act
of state which the United States courts could not examine.
III. Current Areas of Concern and Controversy
The combination of increased international economic activity and uncer-
tain delineation of the reach of United States antitrust law has currently given
"Id. at 1298.
"United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland, [1963] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 1 70,600
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, [19651 TRADE CAS. (CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
3"GUIDE, supra note 4, at 54.
3"168 U.S. 250 (1897)
"Id. at 252.
"Alfred Dunhill v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). See also Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68
(2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Mara-
caibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas and Oil
Co. 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
950 (1972); Timberg, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State Defenses: Transnationat Boycotts
and Economic Coercion, 55 TEXAs L. REV. 1 (1976).
"GuIDE, supra note 4, at 54-55.
"549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
"595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979) See also Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd.,
[1979-11 TR.ADE CAS. (CCH) 62,586 (5th Cir. 1979).
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rise to significant disputes. Let us look in more detail at two of the most
interesting areas of controversy: the application of United States antitrust
law to the acts of foreigners abroad, and the complaint by American busi-
nessmen that our antitrust laws hamper their export success.
A. "Extraterritorial" Reach of United States Antitrust
Laws to Activities Abroad
Few activities of the United States infuriate its friends abroad more than
efforts to apply United States antitrust laws to activities carried on by for-
eigners outside the United States in full compliance with the relevant foreign
law. That they can try to claim the benefit of some technical defense, like "act
of state," is of little solace and only seems to infuriate them more. This
matter of the "extraterritorial" reach of the United States antitrust laws has a
long, if not particularly consistent, legal history which has not yet ended.
In the famous 1909 case, American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,43 the
Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Holmes, spoke of the "general and
almost universal rule . . . that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful
must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done." "'
To apply one's own laws, the Court reasoned, would be an interference with
the authority of another sovereign and contrary to the comity of nations.
Later decisions, however, eroded this concept, and in 1948, Judge Learned
Hand felt able to declare in the landmark Alcoa case'" that it is "settled law
...that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its
allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its
borders which the state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will or-
dinarily recognize. ' "6 This made it clear that governmental and private en-
forcers of the United States antitrust laws could hold foreigners liable for
their activities abroad. 7 Relaxed concepts of personal jurisdiction, relating
to due process notions, venue and service of process, made the challenge of
foreign activities in United States courts quite feasible from the procedural
viewpoint.
Foreign governments have resisted this intrusive doctrine by diplomatic
notes and amicus curiae briefs on our shores and by determined legal resis-
tance to the judgments and orders of our courts on their shores. For example,
in the unanimous decision of the British House of Lords in Rio Tinto Zinc
Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.'" Lord Wilberforce stated that:
"213 U.S. 347 (1909).
"Id. at 356.
"United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)
"Id. at 443.
"See, e.g., GUIDE, supra note 4, at 6 where it is noted that: "When foreign transactions have a
substantial and foreseeable effect on United States commerce, they are subject to United States
law regardless of where they take place."
"[19781 2 W.L.R. 81.
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The intervention of Her Majesty's Attorney-General establishes that quite apart
from the present case, over a number of years and in a number of cases, the policy of
her Majesty's Government has been against recognition of United States investiga-
tory jurisdiction extra-territorially against United Kingdom companies. The courts
should in such matters speak with the same voice as the executive. . . they have, as I
have stated, no difficulty in doing so. 9
Since 1945 at least nineteen other foreign governments have protested
United States assertions of jurisdiction in international antitrust cases. 0 A
number have passed special legislation forbidding the production of docu-
ments located in the foreign country in connection with United States anti-
trust litigation' or precluding the enforcement in those countries of United
States antitrust judgments.5" The sense of outrage has been loud and clear.
The need for more flexibility than the Alcoa rule affords was expressed in
1976 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the
Timberlane case.53 It articulated a "jurisdictional rule of reason"," re-
quiring the courts to apply not only an "effects" test," but an appraisal of
whether, as a matter of international comity and fairness, the extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the United States should be asserted. This approach, the court
said, would involve a weighing of a number of elements, including (among
others) the extent of the foreign law or policy interest, the nationality of the
parties, "the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared
with those elsewhere," and "the extent to which enforcement by either state
could be expected to achieve compliance." '5 6 The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit's decision in Mannington Mills57 adopted the Timberlane bal-
ancing approach for determining whether extraterritorial jurisdiction should
be asserted. The opinion listed a number of factors for appraisal. These
considerations were similar to those posited in Timberlane, which themselves
were similar to those that had been articulated in the Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States.58 The Timberlane approach has been
warmly embraced by the Antitrust Division as well. A speech by the Assistant
Attorney General hailed the elaboration of a jurisdictional rule of reason as
"Id. at 94 See also'British Nylon Spinners v. Imperial Chem. Indus. [1952] W.L.R. 469
(C.A.), made permanent, 11954] 3 W.L.R. 505 (ch.).
"
0 See, e.g., Remarks of Donald L. Flexner, Foreign Discovery and United States Antitrust
Policy-The Conflict Resolving Mechanisms, 1978 Fordham Corporate Law Institute (Nov. 15,
1978); Haight, Extracts from Some Published Material on Official Protests, Directives, Prohibi-
tions, Comments, etc., in REPORT OF THE 51st INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATIONS CONFERENCE
565 (1964).
''See Note, Foreign Nondisclosure Laws and Domestic Discovery Orders in Antitrust Litiga-
tion, 88 YALE L.J. 612 (1979).
"See, e.g., Australian Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act, 1979.
"Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). See also Wells
Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977).
"1549 F.2d at 613.
"Id. at 611.
16Id. at 614.
"Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
"RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965).
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"a long overdue replacement for the awkward 'direct and/or substantial'
test," with the courts "henceforth, in the interest of comity and in a judicially
objective manner," to undertake this difficult balancing process." A recent
speech by another Antitrust Division official noted that the Division has long
abided by the balancing test in determining whether to prosecute and that
"the interdependence of the world economy and legitimate interests of for-
eign sovereigns must be considered in private as well as public antitrust en-
forcement actions under American law." 60
The response of the Justice Department to foreign critics of the extraterri-
torial jurisdiction has been one of trying to preserve the interests of both
antitrust enforcement and good foreign relations. Attorney General Griffin
Bell emphasized the former interest in a speech before the American Bar
Association in which, after acknowledging that "sometimes comity causes us
to stay our hand," he indicated that comity did not preclude extraterritorial
enforcement where the antitrust investigation was "of fundamental United
States interest."'6' However, a subsequent speech by Associate Attorney
General Egan imparted a more conciliatory message, emphasizing the central
role of comity without the suggestion that it does not apply in important
cases.
62
The Timberlane approach, while logical and indeed overdue, is difficult to
apply. It remains to be seen whether the district courts are willing to apply the
balancing task as opposed to the mechanical Alcoa rule and, if they do, how
successfully they will be able to balance the foreign relations issues implicitly
involved. The task of private antitrust counsel will also become more compli-
cated because in advising his client on the threshold jurisdictional issues in an
international antitrust setting, he too will have to engage in this balancing
process.
B. Are the United States Antitrust Laws
Restraining Our Export Effort?
Businessmen have consistently urged that American efforts to increase
exports are restrained and deterred by the broad scope of United States anti-
trust enforcement.6 This deterrent effect, it is argued, is a "drag" not only
on exports of goods, but also on our service industries (including construc-
tion), and extends to cooperative export activities, overseas joint ventures
"Remarks, supra note 1, at 55.
"Remarks by Carl H. Cira, Jr., Assistant Chief of the Antitrust Division's Foreign Commerce
Section, on Future Directions in American Antitrust Law and Policy, at 12 (June 23, 1979).
"Address by Attorney General Griffin B. Bell, supra note 1, at 3, 7.
"Address by Associate Attorney General Michael J. Egan, note I supra.
"See, e.g., ANTITRUST TASK FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT OF THE CHAM-
BER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, FINAL REPORT ON UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS
AND AMERICAN EXPORTS (1974); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF UNITED STATES ANTI-
TRUST LAWS: AN ISSUE ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC REALITY (1974).
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and consortia, foreign licensing, and even acquisition of foreign companies.
The Webb-Pomerene Act," while designed to permit export cooperation
through an antitrust exemption, covers only about 2 percent of total United
States exports, with between 25 to 35 Webb-Pomerene associations registered
with the Federal Trade Commission. 5 United States business representatives
have maintained that the exemption provided by the Act is too narrow and
perilous to afford them antitrust protection while doing battle in the world
marketplace. They point out that other developed nations impose no such
antitrust restraints, but rather back export cartels and giant consortia
through subsidies and other support devices. Thus, business seeks a broaden-
ing of the antitrust exemption, such as expansion of the scope of the Webb-
Pomerene Act to cover exports of services.
The Antitrust Division has never been sympathetic to this viewpoint and
has taken the position that business has failed to make the empirical case to
establish that antitrust enforcement is substantially hampering United States
export trade.66 The Division maintains that exemptions, such as Webb-
Pomerene, breed collusion among competitors in domestic dealings and help
foreigners to justify their own restrictive export cartels. Therefore, they ar-
gue such exemptions should be repealed as misguided pieces of legislation.
The Division also reiterates that it is prepared to give prompt review and a
relatively sympathetic ear to the proposals of United States businessmen who
feel that they need to cooperate in order to garner business abroad. 7
Recently, President Carter launched a new export drive in which he
pledged to curb overly broad applications of the Sherman Act which might
unnecessarily inhibit United States firms from selling abroad.6" He referred
particularly to the uncertain legal status of foreign joint ventures and, after
stating that this uncertainty could be a disincentive to exports, instructed the
Justice Department, together with the Department of Commerce, "to clarify
and explain the scope of the antitrust laws in this area, with special emphasis
on the kinds of joint ventures that are unlikely to raise antitrust problems"
and "to give expedited treatment to [business review] requests by business
firms for guidance on international antitrust issues." '6 The President also
appointed a business advisory panel to work with the National Commission
for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures.
"15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976).
"Amacher, Sweeney & Tollison, A Note on the Webb-Pomerene Law and the Webb Cartels,
23 ANTITRUST BULL. 371-72 (1978).
"See, e.g., Remarks by John H. Shenefield, Enforcement of United States Trade Opportuni-
ties Through Antitrust Enforcement and Competition Advocacy, The National Governors As-
sociation/White House Seminar on International Trade (June 6, 1979), at 3.
"See, e.g., GUIDE, supra note 4, at 19-22 (Case C), wherein the Antitrust Division approves a
situation involving a consortium established for the purpose of submitting a bid on an extremely
large hydroelectric project in a Latin American country.
6'Excerpts of Press Conference of President Carter, (Sept. 26, 1978) reprinted in [July-Dec.
1978 Transfer Binder] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 882, A-4-5, (1978).
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This panel, laboring under the deadlines set for the Commission, con-
ducted a brief study and recommended that the Webb-Pomerene exemption
should be retained."0 It found that several industries rely heavily on the Act
and concluded that the present foreign trade deficit made this an inopportune
time for repeal of the Act. The National Commission took a more hostile
view of the Act, finding that it "creates opportunities for significant anti-
competitive spillover effects in domestic commerce" and that its basic pur-
poses can be accomplished without antitrust immunity." It recommended a
legislative reexamination of the necessity for the exemption, with the caveat
that "[b]efore American firms receive antitrust immunity for export business
activities they should at a minimum be required to make a showing of need.
The burden of proof justifying special treatment ought to be on those seeking
such treatment."
7 2
So the issue of whether to expand, contract, or repeal Webb-Pomerene has
been dumped into the lap of the Congress. The Antitrust Division, mean-
while, has announced that it will meet with businessmen to respond to busi-
ness review requests involving export projects within thirty business days
after receiving the necessary information. 3 However, the Division reiterated
at the same time that the antitrust laws do not impair our export effort and
that it will not hesitate to pursue antitrust violators beyond our shores. In
short, the standoff appears to be about where it has been for the last twenty
years.
IV. Conclusions
We have seen that, in applying United States antitrust law to international
transactions, yesterday's problems tend still to be today's problems. These
issues have been given a greater immediacy by the coming of age of the
international economy. 74 United States antitrust law and policy have been
adapting slowly, perhaps too slowly, to these economic developments. The
capacity for flexibility of the courts and the antitrust enforcement agencies
will be an important factor in determining how relevant and satisfactory
United States antitrust law will be in the 1980s and beyond.
'O2 NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES REPORT,
Attachment A, at 303 (Jan. 22, 1979).
"Id. Vol. 1, at 295-306.
"Id. at 303.
"Remarks by John H. Shenefield, supra note 66, at 8.
"There are, to be sure, new efforts being made at the international level to establish norms
with regard to restrictive business practices, spurred largely by the developing countries. See,
e.g., Davidow & Chiles, The United States and the Issue of the Binding or Voluntary Nature of
International Codes of Conduct Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 247
(1978); J oelson, The Proposed International Codes of Conduct as Related to Restrictive Busi-
ness Practices, 8 L. & PoL. INT'L BUS. 837 (1976).
